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| Tekijä: | Miller, R.M. |
| Otsikko: | Can markets learn to avoid bubbles? |
| Lehti: | Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets
2002 : VOL. 3:1, p. 44-52 |
| Asiasana: | MARKETS LEARNING MODELS ANALYTICAL REVIEW |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article re-examines bubble experiments in light of the results of an earlier series of market experiments that show how learning occurs in markets characterized by an asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers, such as found in Akerlof's lemons model and Spence's signaling model. Markets with asymmetric information are incomplete because they lack markets for specific levels of product quality. Such markets either lump all qualities together (lemons) or using external indications of quality to separate them (signaling). Similarly, the markets used in bubble experiments are incomplete in that they are lacking a complete set of forward or futures markets, depriving traders of the information supplied by the prices in those markets. |
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