haku: @all stability / yhteensä: 98
viite: 96 / 98
| Tekijä: | Weikard, H-P. Finus, M. Altamirano-Cabera, J-C. |
| Otsikko: | The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements |
| Lehti: | Oxford Economic Papers
2006 : APR, VOL. 58:2, p. 209-232 |
| Asiasana: | climate contracts co-operation environmental protection pollution |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. A 12-region model is used to examine internal and external stability of coalitions. Stable coalitions are determined and compared under different surplus sharing rules; for example, grandfathering (sharing proportional to current emissions) and a number of equitable rules, i.e. sharing according to historical responsibilities for past emissions. Due to strong free-rider incentives the study finds only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. |
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