haku: @indexterm Agency theory / yhteensä: 286
viitteet: 16-25 / 286
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16.
A model of person-pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements
Strategic Management Journal
2010 : AUG, VOL. 31:8, p. 803-821
 2010 Wowak, A.J.
Hambrick, D.C.
17.
Governance, ownership structure, and performance of IPO firms: the impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments
Strategic Management Journal
2010 : MAY, VOL: 31:5, p. 491-509
 2010 Bruton, G.D. (et al.)
18.
Corporate collaborative activity: exploratory evidence on the determinants of vehicle choice
European Journal of Finance
2010 : APR-JUN, VOL. 16:3-4, p. 201-225
 2010 Burton, B.
19.
Governance bundles, firm performance, and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms
Corporate governance
2009 : SEP, VOL. 17:5, p. 646-660
 2009 Ward, A.J.
Brown, J.A.
Rodriguez, D.
20.
Corporate governance and earnings management: a meta-analysis
Corporate governance
2009 : SEP, VOL. 17:5, p. 594–610
 2009 García-Meca, E.
Sánchez-Ballesta, J.P.
21.
Boards of directors, CEO ownership, and the use of non-financial performance measures in the CEO bonus plan
Corporate governance
2009 : JAN, VOL. 17:1, p. 90-106
 2009 Schiehll, E.
Bellavance, F.
22.
Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: new insights for agency theory
Corporate governance
2009 : MAR, VOL. 17:2, p. 142-158
 2009 Safieddine, A.
23.
Is CEO duality always negative? An exploration of CEO duality and ownership structure in the Arab IPO context
Corporate governance
2009 : MAR, VOL. 17:2, p. 123-141
 2009 Chahine, S.
Tohme, N.S.
24.
Inside agency: the rise and fall of Nortel
Journal of Business Ethics
2009 : JAN II, VOL 84:2, p. 165-187
 2009 Fogarty, T. (et al.)
25.
Governance mechanisms and firm value: the impact of ownership concentration and dividends
Corporate governance
2009 : NOV, VOL. 17:6 p. 694-709
 2009 Setia-Atmaja, L.Y.
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