haku: @indexterm GAME THEORY / yhteensä: 415
viitteet: 206-215 / 415
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 otsikkovuositekijä
206.
Cooperation by credible threats - on the social costs of transfer contests under uncertainty.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1993 : SEP, VOL. 149:3, p. 559-578
 1993 Yang, C. L.
207.
After Madrid and Maastricht... Should we rethink negotiations?
European Business Review
1993 : VOL. 43:4, p. 19-25
 1993 Garson, J.
Quillien, J.
208.
Transaction cost economics meets Posnerian law and economics.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1993 : MAR, VOL. 149:1, p. 99-118
 1993 Williamson, O. E.
209.
An experimental test of equilibrium dominance in signaling games. (!Sequential equilibrium)
American Economic Review
1992 : DEC, VOL. 82:5, p. 1350-1365
 1992 Brandts, J.
Holt, C. A.
210.
A game-theoretic approach to the analysis of simple congested networks.
American Economic Review
1992 : MAY, VOL. 82:2, p. 494-500
 1992 Palma, A. De
211.
Vancouver's gasoline-price wars: an empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies
Review of Economic Studies
1992 : APR, VOL. 59(2):199, p.257-576
 1992 Slade, M. E.
212.
La strategie militaire appliquee a la vie des affaires: Austerlitz ou Waterloo? = Military strategy applied to business life: interest and danger
Revue Francaise de Gestion
1992 : JAN-FEB, NO. 87, p.24-29
 1992 Danet, D.
213.
Spieltheorie und Industrieoekonomik = Game theory and industrial economy
IFO-Studien
1992 : No. 3-4 p. 271-316
 1992 Güth, W.
214.
Stochastic and Intransitive Behavior in a State-Preference Model of Asset Choice
Decision Sciences
1992 : SEP/OCT, VOL. 23:5, p. 1114-1126
 1992 Bernardo, J.J.
Upton, D.E.
215.
A criterion for comparing strength of preference with an application to bargaining
Operations Research
1992 : SEP-OCT, VOL. 40:5, p. 1018-1022
 1992 Peters, H.
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