haku: @author Babcock, L. / yhteensä: 1
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| Tekijä: | Babcock, L. |
| Otsikko: | Biased judgments of fairness in bargaining |
| Lehti: | American Economic Review
1995 : DEC, VOL. 85:5, p. 1337-1343 |
| Asiasana: | EXHIBITIONS BARGAINING BIAS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | When court trials (or arbitration) are the mechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses, the costs and risks are associated with third-party intervention should motivate settlement (Henry Farber and Harry Katz, 1979). However, empirical evidence suggests that impasses and inefficient settlements are common in the legal system and in contract negotiations. In this paper the authors propose an explanation for impasse that rests on disputants' misestimations of judicial decisions. The authors conjecture that predictions of judicial decisions will be systematically biased in a self-serving manner. |
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