haku: @author Lehrer, E. / yhteensä: 1
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| Tekijä: | Lehrer, E. Smorodinsky, R. |
| Otsikko: | Repeated large games with incomplete information |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1997 : JAN, VOL. 18:1, p. 116-134 |
| Asiasana: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR INFORMATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors examine repeated games with incomplete information where the type spaces of the players may be large. It is shown that if the belief of each player, regarding future play of the game, accommodates the true play then a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game will evolve, with time, into an equilibrium of the complete information game, i. e., the realised game where the types of all players are common knowledge. They introduce the notion of accommodating beliefs which involves two requirements. |
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