haku: @author Tella, R. Di / yhteensä: 1
viite: 1 / 1
« edellinen | seuraava »
| Tekijä: | Bliss, C. Tella, R. Di |
| Otsikko: | Does competition kill corruption? |
| Lehti: | Journal of Political Economy
1997 : OCT, VOL. 105:5, p. 1001-1023 |
| Asiasana: | POLITICAL ECONOMY COMPETITION CORRUPTION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Corrupt agents (official or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures. Increases in competition may not lower corruption. The model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit. Assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare. |
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA