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| Tekijä: | Buchholz, W. Haslbeck, C. |
| Otsikko: | Strategic manipulation of property rights in Coasean bargaining |
| Lehti: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1997 : DEC, VOL. 153:4, p. 630-640 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS BARGAINING PROPERTY RIGHTS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | In a model of Coasean bargaining over externalities it is described how agents can manipulate their opponent's reservation utility by strategic actions at a pre-bargaining stage, such as the choice of a pollution technology. This may imply a misallocation of resources, and opening up trade possibilities will not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement. This problem is specific to bargaining over externalities and will never occur in the exchange of private goods. |
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