haku: @author Leblanc, W. / yhteensä: 1
viite: 1 / 1
« edellinen | seuraava »
| Tekijä: | Leblanc, W. Snyder, J. M. Tripathi, M. |
| Otsikko: | Majority-rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2000 : JAN, VOL. 75:1, p. 21-47 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMETRIC MODELS POLITICAL ECONOMY BARGAINING INVESTMENTS BUDGET PUBLIC SECTOR |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The paper builds on Baron and Ferejohn's bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics. The paper shows that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within the majoritarian institution. The inability of current majorities to contract with future ones drives a wedge between spending on consumption today and investing for future consumption. |
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA