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Tekijä:Gillette, A. B.
Noe, T. H.
Rebello, M. J.
Otsikko:Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence
Lehti:Journal of Finance
2003 : OCT, VOL. 58:5, p. 1997-2031
Asiasana:Board of directors
Chief executive officers
Corporate responsibility
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. The model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdogs" can implement institutionally preferred policies. The model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 250976
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