haku: @author Asheim, G.B. (et al.) / yhteensä: 1
viite: 1 / 1
« edellinen | seuraava »
| Tekijä: | Asheim, G.B. (et al.) |
| Otsikko: | Regional versus global cooperation for climate control |
| Lehti: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2006 : JAN, VOL. 51:1, p. 93-109 |
| Asiasana: | CONTRACTS climate co-operation |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article discusses whether international environmental public goods provision, such as mitigation of climate change, is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global treaty. Previous research suggests that, at best, a global environmental treaty will achieve very little. Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, with weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as solution concept, the authors show that two agreements can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a single global treaty. The model provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under each type of regime. It is suggested that a regime with two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty. |
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA