haku: @author Gabaix, X. / yhteensä: 1
viite: 1 / 1
« edellinen | seuraava »
| Tekijä: | Edmans, A. Gabaix, X. |
| Otsikko: | Is CEO pay really inefficient? A survey of new optimal contracting theories |
| Lehti: | European Financial Management
2009 : JUN, VOL. 15:3, p. 486-496 |
| Asiasana: | chief executive officers contracts executive remuneration incentives |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | It has been argued that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. Nevertheless, it may be that simple models do not capture several complexities of real-life settings. The paper here surveys recent theories that extend traditional frameworks to incorporate these dimensions, and shows that the above features can be fully consistent with efficiency. |
« edellinen | seuraava »
SCIMA