haku: @author Velasco, A. / yhteensä: 10
viite: 2 / 10
| Tekijä: | Velasco, A. |
| Otsikko: | Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2000 : APR, VOL. 76:1, p. 105-126 |
| Asiasana: | FISCAL POLICY DEBT GAMES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper develops a political-economic model of fiscal policy -- one in which government resources are a "common property" out of which interest groups can finance expenditures on their preferred items. This setup has striking macroeconomic implications. Transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be; fiscal deficits emerge even when there are no reasons for international smoothing, and in the long run government debt tends to be excessively high. |
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