haku: @indexterm Referendums / yhteensä: 10
viite: 2 / 10
| Tekijä: | Schaltegger, C.A. Feld, L.P. |
| Otsikko: | Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss cantons |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2009 : FEB, VOL. 93:1-2, p. 35-47 |
| Asiasana: | Switzerland fiscal policy referendums |
| Vapaa asiasana: | fragmentation legislative rules |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The fiscal commons problem is one of the most significant explanations of excessive spending in political economics. This paper examines the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes for a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 periods. This study distinguishes between two variants of fragmented governments. These are cabinet size and coalition size. This paper analyzes whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation. The findings suggest that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of the government. There is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent. |
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