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| Tekijä: | Langberg, N. Sivaramakrishnan, K. |
| Otsikko: | Voluntary disclosures and information production by analysts |
| Lehti: | Journal of Accounting & Economics
2008 : SEP, VOL. 46:1, p. 78-100 |
| Asiasana: | disclosure accounting principles managers news reporting financial reporting |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This study analyzes the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. An equilibrium is derived in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. It is shown that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. Furthermore, more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures, and a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures. |
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