haku: @indexterm SUBCONTRACTS / yhteensä: 108
viite: 68 / 108
| Tekijä: | Balachandran, K. R. Ronen, J. |
| Otsikko: | Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted. |
| Lehti: | European Journal of Operational Research
1989 : MAY 25, VOL. 40:2, p. 169-185 |
| Asiasana: | PRICING SUBCONTRACTS TRANSFER PRICING OPTIMIZATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The problem of pricing for products under subcontracting is set in an agency theory format. Characteristics of decentralisation, moral hazard and adverse selection are inherent in this problem. Under these conditions which transfer revenue schedules might emerge and whether they make any intuitive sense from the standpoint of their similarity with demand schedules in general and with what one expects to observe in reality in the form of a transfer price that allows for quantity discounts. Precise conditions under which individual rationality and equality do not meet when the agent's utility function is not separable, are shown. Optimal incentive compensation function and transfer price are analysed in details. |
SCIMA