haku: @author Brunello, G. / yhteensä: 11
viite: 4 / 11
| Tekijä: | Brunello, G. Graziano, C. Parigi, B. |
| Otsikko: | Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2001 : JAN, VOL. 19:1-2, p. 133-161 |
| Asiasana: | EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION AGENCY THEORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors use survey data to investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. This is the first empirical study on the compensation of Italian executives. The authors' key hypothesis is that the characteristics of the Italian capital market, corporate governance and the specific relationship between banks and firms imply a low fraction of incentive pay over total compensation and a low sensitivity of incentive pay to firm performance. The authors find evidence that supports this hypothesis. The authors estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of upper and middle managers by only 31 thousand lire, more than the increase found for lower management. |
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