haku: @freeterm takeovers / yhteensä: 11
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| Tekijä: | Bates, T.W. Becher, D.A. Lemmon, M.L. |
| Otsikko: | Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control |
| Lehti: | Journal of Financial Economics
2008 : MAR, VOL. 87:3, p. 656-677 |
| Asiasana: | board of directors corporate governance executives directors management mergers public corporations USA |
| Vapaa asiasana: | acquisitions takeovers antitakeover provisions |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper deals with the relation btw. board classification (here as: b-classn.), takeover activity, and transaction outcomes for a panel of firms from 1990 to 2002. Target b-classn. does not alter the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is totally acquired. Furthermore, shareholders of targets with a classified board realize bid returns equivalent to those of targets with a single class of directors, but receive a higher proportion of total bid surplus. B-classn. does reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid. Yet, the economic effect of bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small. In general, the evidence is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom of b-classn. being is an anti-takeover device facilitating managerial entrenchment. |
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