haku: @journal_id 1405 / yhteensä: 110
viite: 35 / 110
| Tekijä: | Laffont, J. Rochet, C. |
| Otsikko: | Regulation of a risk averse firm |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1998 : NOV, VOL. 25:2, p. 149-173 |
| Asiasana: | REGULATIONS RISK AVERSION COMPANIES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors extend the Laffont-Tirole regulation model to the case of risk-averse firms. The authors main results are: 1. The impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost-plus contract. 2. As compared with the risk-neutral case, distortions are greater and infomrational rents are smaller. 3. For high levels of risk aversion, the optimal contract invloves cost ceilings and the least efficient firms are bunched together. |
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