haku: @journal_id 1405 / yhteensä: 110
viite: 26 / 110
| Tekijä: | Sjostrom, T. |
| Otsikko: | Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
1999 : FEB, VOL. 26:2, p. 337-352 |
| Asiasana: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IMPLEMENTATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This article looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then any Pareto-efficient social choice function can be implemented if there are at least three agents who play undominated Nash equilibria. |
SCIMA