haku: @journal_id 1405 / yhteensä: 110
viite: 15 / 110
| Tekijä: | Dastidar, K.G. |
| Otsikko: | Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable? |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
2000 : AUG, VOL. 32:2, p. 206-218 |
| Asiasana: | Equilibrium analysis Oligopoly |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper considers a homogeneous product oligopoly, where the Cournot equilibrium is regular and unique. It is shown that for duopoly, a unique Cournot equilibrium is always locally stable. For a "n" firm asymmetric cost oligopoly a unique Cournot equilibrium is locally stable under very general conditions. The sufficient conditions for local stability of a unique Cournot equilibrium are much less restrictive than what the existing literature suggests. For a symmetric cost oligopoly the unique Cournot equilibrium is almost always locally stable, except for a perverse case. |
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