haku: @journal_id 1405 / yhteensä: 110
viite: 6 / 110
| Tekijä: | Jacobsen, H.J. Jensen, M. Sloth, B. |
| Otsikko: | Evolutionary learning in signalling games |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
2001 : VOL.34:1, p. 34-63 |
| Asiasana: | EVOLUTIONARY GAMES LEARNING |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors have studied equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process they studied extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57-84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the so-called Riley equilibrium will be observed frequently. |
SCIMA