haku: @journal_id 1405 / yhteensä: 110
viite: 2 / 110
| Tekijä: | Binmore, K Samuelson, L. |
| Otsikko: | Evolution and mixed strategies |
| Lehti: | Games and Economic Behavior
2001 : FEB, VOL. 34:2, p. 200-226 |
| Asiasana: | EVOLUTIONARY GAMES STRATEGY GAMES |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Selten (1980, J. Theoret. Biol., 84, 93-101) showed that no mixed equilibria are evolutionarily stable when players can condition their strategies on their roles in a game. Alternatively, Harsanyi's (1973, Int. J. Game Theory, 2, 1- 23) purification argument implies that all mixed equilibria are approximations of strict, and hence evolutionarily stable, equilibria of games with slightly perturbed payoffs. This paper reconciles these results: Approximations of mixed equilibria have high invasion barriers, and hence are likely to persist, when payoff perturbations are relatively important and role identification is relatively noisy. When payoff perturbations are unimportant and role identification is precise, approximations of mixed equilibria will have small invasion barriers and are unlikely to persist. |
SCIMA