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Tekijä:Harrington, J.E.Jr.
Otsikko:Post-cartel pricing during litigation
Lehti:Journal of Industrial Economics
2004 : DEC, VOL. 52:4, p. 517-533
Asiasana:Cartels
Industrial economics
Litigation
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This article examines price-fixing cases during litigation. There seems to be a strategic incentive for companies to price above the non-collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. The extent of this upward bias in price setting is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the concentrated the industry.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 258183
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