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| Tekijä: | Eriksen, K.W. Kvaloy, O. Olsen, T.E. |
| Otsikko: | Tournaments with prize-setting agents |
| Lehti: | Scandinavian Journal of Economics
2011 : VOL. 113:3, p. 729-753 |
| Asiasana: | incentives prices theories |
| Vapaa asiasana: | experiments |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The contestants themselves determine reward allocation in some tournaments. Union members negotiate on wage distribution, and some firms let self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and labour division. This study analyses and experimentally tests a tournament with heterogeneous agents determining the spread btw. winner prize and loser prize. Explored are the relationship btw. prize spread (herein as: pr-spd.), uncertainty (as: uncy.), heterogeneity (as: htgy.), and effort. It is found that a large pr-spd. is associated with a low degree of uncy. and a high degree of htgy., and that htgy. triggers effort. In general, the theoretical predictions are supported by this real-effort experiment. |
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