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Tekijä:Cason, T. N.
Gangadharan, L.
Duke, C.
Otsikko:A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution
Lehti:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2003 : NOV, VOL. 46:3, p. 446-471
Asiasana:auctions
land use
pollution
regulations
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper discusses auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. A laboratory experiment, in which landholder/sellers in sealed-offer auctions compete to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the regulator to subsidize abatement, is presented. In one treatment the regulator reveals to landholders the environmental benefits estimated for their projects , and in other treatment the regulator conceals the potential projects' "environmental quality". The results suggest that sellers' offers misrepresent their costs more for high-quality projects when quality is revealed, so total abatement is lower and seller profits higher when landholders know their projects' environmental benefits.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 258382
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