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Tekijä:Herrendorf, B.
Otsikko:Inflation targeting as a way of precommitment
Lehti:Oxford Economic Papers
1998 : JUL, VOL. 50:3, p. 431-448
Asiasana:Monetary policy
Inflation
Central banks
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:In the paper, an institutional arrangement is considered in which the government assigns a publicly-announced inflation target to an instrument-independent central bank, but retains the discretion to revise the inflation target after wages have been set. It is argued that since this arrangement is transparent, it solves Canzoneri's private information problem, ensures perfect monitoring of the government, and makes reputational forces more effective. Cases are characterized in which, for this reason, inflation targeting mitigates the inflationary bias of monetary policy.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 180768
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