haku: @journal_id 571 / yhteensä: 1184
viite: 185 / 1184
Tekijä: | Arend, R. |
Otsikko: | Obtaining R&D joint venture co-operation under prisoners dilemma incentives: logic and experiment |
Lehti: | European Management Journal
2005 : OCT, VOL. 23:5, p. 520 532 |
Asiasana: | R&D |
Vapaa asiasana: | joint ventures prisoners dilemma |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | Actions and profits which are familiar to Prisoners Dilemma game can be found in some R&D join ventures; companies can cooperate or they can act harmfully in the venture. If the inputs and outcomes of the venture are impossible to independently verify, the dominant solution from the Prisoners Dilemma game, called the mutual defection, appears also in the venture. The author argues that the use of new exposing methods for defections should be introduced for triggering sanctions; according to the article this leads to better cooperation of parties in the venture. An experimental test for testing the solution is presented and as a result higher levels of cooperation can be perceived. |
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