haku: @indexterm Supervision / yhteensä: 119
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Tekijä:Faure-Grimaud, A.
Laffont, J.-J.
Martimort, D.
Otsikko:Collusion, delegation and supervision with soft information
Lehti:Review of Economic Studies
2003 : VOL. 70:2(243), p. 253-279
Asiasana:Economic theory
Asymmetric information
Organizational research
Supervision
Vapaa asiasana:Equivalence principle
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. The authors consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 253089
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