haku: @author Slade, M. E. / yhteensä: 12
viite: 9 / 12
| Tekijä: | Slade, M. E. |
| Otsikko: | Interfirm rivalry in a repeated game : an empirical test of tacit collusion. |
| Lehti: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1987 : JUN, VOL. 35:4, p. 499-516 |
| Asiasana: | INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INTERFIRM COMPARISONS PETROLEUM STATIONS CANADA STATISTICAL METHODS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Rivalry in the Vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game. Service-station demand, cost, and reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices, costs and sales. These functions are used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constituent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game. The actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution. Nevertheless, all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period. |
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