haku: @indexterm INFORMATION ECONOMICS / yhteensä: 126
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| Tekijä: | Kunz, A. H. Pfeiffer, T. |
| Otsikko: | Investitionsbudgetierung und implizite Verträge: Wie resistent ist der Grovesmechanismus bei dynamischer Interaktion? |
| Lehti: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1999 : VOL. 51:3, p. 203- 223 |
| Asiasana: | AGENCY THEORY ACCOUNTING INFORMATION ECONOMICS AGENCIES |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | Applied agency theory in accounting has always been particularly interested in mechanisms which induce thruthful reporting in divisionally organized corporations. Consequently, advantages and disadvantages of the so called Grovesscheme have been thoroughly scrutinized in the literature. Although the mechanism seems to provide thruthful reporting under specified conditions, it may be vulnerable to exploitation by colluding agents. Despite this Budde/Göx/Luhmer (1998) recently showed in a one period model that collusion among rational agents is not a dominant strategy: Since the agents cannot enforce a binding contract in court, they fail to commit credibly upon their own reporting strategy. The starting point of this paper is to test whether this result still holds in a dynamic setting where agents interact over multiple periods. We conclude, that the Groves-scheme fails. |
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