haku: @indexterm INFORMATION ECONOMICS / yhteensä: 126
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Tekijä:Abbring, J. H.
Chiappori, P.-A.
Pinquet, J.
Otsikko:Moral hazard and dynamic insurance data
Lehti:Journal of the European Economic Association
2003 : JUN, VOL. 1:4, p. 767-820
Asiasana:Information economics
Moral hazard
Insurance companies
Car industry
Contracts
France
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors show that experience rating implies negative occurence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. They then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinuish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. They find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 251013
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