haku: @indexterm international organizations / yhteensä: 128
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| Tekijä: | Simmons, B. |
| Otsikko: | Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar years |
| Lehti: | International Organization
1996 : SUMMER, VOL. 50:3, p. 407-444 |
| Asiasana: | INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS STRATEGY CENTRAL BANKS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Central Bank independence is associated with restrictive monetary choices that can be deflationary within fixed exchange-rate regimes. Because central banks act to counteract domestic inflation, they put a premium on domestic price stability at the expense of international monetary stability. Evidence from 15 countries between 1925 and 1938 shows that the more independent central banks took more deflationary policies than were necessary for external adjustment. Central banks in general were more restrictive under left-wing governments than they were under more conservative regimes. |
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