haku: @author Zeckhauser, R. / yhteensä: 13
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| Tekijä: | Lindsey II, J. H. Samuelson, W. Zeckhauser, R. |
| Otsikko: | Selling procedures with private information and common values |
| Lehti: | Management Science
1996 : FEB, VOL. 42:2, p. 220-231 |
| Asiasana: | BARGAINING VALUATION GAME THEORY ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The most common method for making transactions in modern economies is the seller posted-price procedure. This paper analyses the performance of posted pricing for transactions having significant common-value elements. The paper characterizes the fully revealing, perfect equilibrium offer strategy of the seller, in a model of two-sided private information. Equilibrium behavior under other pricing procedures, a sealed-bid procedure and a direct revelation mechanism, are also characterized. The efficiency of these procedures are examined. The paper shows that as the degree of common values increases, fewer mutually beneficial agreements are attained. |
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