haku: @author Baron, D. P. / yhteensä: 13
viite: 6 / 13
| Tekijä: | Baron, D. P. Besanko, D. |
| Otsikko: | Commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship. |
| Lehti: | Review of Economic Studies
1987 : JUL, VOL. 54:179, p. 413-436 |
| Asiasana: | FIRM (THEORY OF) PRICING COSTS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has private information which may be revealed through performance is considered. If it cannot make commitments to future policies, the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals. It is shown that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval. A "fairness" arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type is revealed in earlier periods. The properties of such arrangements are studied. |
SCIMA