haku: @author Anderson, S. P. / yhteensä: 14
viite: 6 / 14
| Tekijä: | Anderson, S. P. Leruth, L. |
| Otsikko: | Why firms may prefer not to price discriminate via mixed bundling. |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1993 : MAR, VOL. 11:1, p. 49-61 |
| Asiasana: | COMPANIES MODELS PRICE DISCRIMINATION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A simple model of joint purchase discounts are analyzed using a discrete choice framework to characterize consumer choices. Mixed bundling refers to the practice of offering consumers the option of either buying two goods separately or else a package of both. The model suggests that mixed bundling is more likely to be associated with monopoly. This is due to the benefits reaped via price discrimination. In a duopoly environment, however, only pure components pricing may be offered in equilibrium since firms fear the extra degree of competition inherit in mixed bundling. |
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