haku: @author Samuelson, L. / yhteensä: 14
viite: 4 / 14
Tekijä:Binmore, K.
Samuelson, L.
Otsikko:An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms
Lehti:Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1994 : MAR, VOL. 150:1, p. 45-63
Asiasana:GAME THEORY
ECONOMICS
SOCIOLOGY
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:This paper seeks to close the gap between the models of man used by economists and sociologists. The problem of the evolution of social norms is identified with the equilibrium selection problem in game theory. Adopting such a view requires that sociologists be ready to regard social norms as being endogenously determined, and for economists to abandon the literature on refinements of Nash equilibrium in favour of an evolutional approach.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 111839
lisää koriin
SCIMA