haku: @author Anderson, M. / yhteensä: 14
viite: 10 / 14
Tekijä:Anderson, M.
Kanatas, G.
Otsikko:Asymmetric information, dividends, and external financing
Lehti:Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
1995 : SEP, VOL. 5:3, p. 271-290
Asiasana:DIVIDENDS
INVESTORS
INCENTIVES
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The authors analyze a signaling game where firms' dividend announcements convey private information but the possible need to externally finance the dividend creates an incentive conflict between inside and outside investors. Consequently, the attempt to address an adverse selection problem creates (or exacerbates) moral hazard. The interaction of these two imperfect information problems results in equilibria that may be separating or pooling.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 139383
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