haku: @author McCormick, B. / yhteensä: 14
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| Tekijä: | Malcomson, J.M. Maw, J.W. McCormick, B. |
| Otsikko: | General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy |
| Lehti: | European Economic Review
2003 : APR, VOL. 47:2, p. 197-227 |
| Asiasana: | Companies Training Labour Regulations Policy |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length enhances efficiency. |
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