haku: @author Lin, C. / yhteensä: 14
viite: 3 / 14
| Tekijä: | Fan, C.S. Lin, C. Treisman, D. |
| Otsikko: | Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world |
| Lehti: | Journal of Public Economics
2009 : FEB, VOL. 93:1-2, p. 14-34 |
| Asiasana: | political economy corruption decentralisation |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, previous empirical studies have suggested conflicting conclusions. In this study two new data sources are combined and explored in search of more precise findings. The results reveal that bribery was more frequent in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and a larger number of local public employees. Bribery was less frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue. The findings suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex. |
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