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| Tekijä: | Meade, N. Brown, R. |
| Otsikko: | Antitakeover devices and management efficiency: an empirical study using accounting measures |
| Lehti: | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
1995 : DEC, VOL. 5:4, p. 375-392 |
| Asiasana: | ACCOUNTING PRICES CHANGE |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Separation of corporate ownership and control creates an environment whereby the agent (management) may pursue self-interest at the expense of the principal (stockholders). One mechanism protecting stockholders from self-interested management is the market for corporate control, or the takeover market. Antitakeover devices impede the operations of this market. This paper reports on the study of one type of antitakeover device, the supermajority nonfair price amendment. This device is particularly onerous, and if antitakeover devices do protect inefficient management, then evidence of inefficiency should be observable for companies adopting supermajority nonfair price amendments. |
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