haku: @journal_id 101 / yhteensä: 1491
viite: 166 / 1491
| Tekijä: | Hofmann C. |
| Otsikko: | Investitionssteuerung über Budgets oder Verrechungspreise |
| Lehti: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
2002 : MAY, VOL. 72:5, p. 529-556 |
| Asiasana: | INVESTMENTS INVESTMENT ANALYSIS BUDGET AGENCY THEORY |
| Kieli: | ger |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper considers the incentives for investment decisions based on budgets allocated to the agent and transfer prices for the invested capital. Especially, the authors analyze the consequences of renegotiation proof contracts in a principal/agent-framework. For both mechanisms the authors determine the conditions that are necessary for using non-negotiation proof contracts. Comparing both mechanisms, the authors of the article observe that transfer prices frequently result in a lower expected return to the principal. The paper provides a substantial list of references on this subject (original in German). |
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