haku: @author Gal-Or, E. / yhteensä: 15
viite: 10 / 15
| Tekijä: | Gal-Or, E. |
| Otsikko: | Internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly. |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1993 : JUN, VOL. 11:2, p. 157-183 |
| Asiasana: | ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE COMPENSATION OLIGOPOLY MODELS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The benefit that an oligopolistic firm derives from departmentalization depends upon the internal organization of the rival firm. AS a result, even if both firms are assured, a priori, identical, they need not select an identical form of internal organization. A duopolist derives more restricted benefits from departmentalizing compared with a monopolist. The implications of increased competition or the form of internal organization upon the compensation of managers depends upon the degree of correlation between the uncertain demands that face competing firms. |
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