haku: @author Maskin, E. / yhteensä: 15
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| Tekijä: | Maskin, E. |
| Otsikko: | Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality |
| Lehti: | Review of Economic Studies
1999 : JAN, VOL. 66:1(226), p. 23-38 |
| Asiasana: | ECONOMICS EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WELFARE |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of "welfare optima". A game form (or "mechanism") implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form and (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. |
SCIMA