haku: @author Tufano, P. / yhteensä: 15
viite: 2 / 15
Tekijä: | Khorana, A. Tufano, P. Wedge, L. |
Otsikko: | Board structure, mergers, and shareholder wealth: a study of the mutual fund industry |
Lehti: | Journal of Financial Economics
2007 : AUG, VOL. 85:2, p. 571-598 |
Asiasana: | government mergers shareholders unit trusts |
Kieli: | eng |
Tiivistelmä: | Here, mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 are studied to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergerstypically across-family mergersbenefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation. |
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