haku: @journal_id 61 / yhteensä: 1561
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| Tekijä: | Gillette, A. B. Noe, T. H. Rebello, M. J. |
| Otsikko: | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence |
| Lehti: | Journal of Finance
2003 : OCT, VOL. 58:5, p. 1997-2031 |
| Asiasana: | Board of directors Chief executive officers Corporate responsibility |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | The authors examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. The model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdogs" can implement institutionally preferred policies. The model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. |
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