haku: @author Kraft, K. / yhteensä: 16
viite: 5 / 16
Tekijä:Kraft, K.
Niederprüm, A.
Otsikko:Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm
Lehti:Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1999 : SEP, VOL. 40:1, p. 17-27
Asiasana:Management
Pay
Company ownership
Theories
Vapaa asiasana:Management incentives
Kieli:eng
Tiivistelmä:The salaries of top managers consist of two parts: one part depending on profits, the other being constant. In a model of management compensation schemes with risk averse agents, Holmström and Milgrom (1987) predict that increasing variance in profits ought to reduce the profit-relatedness of salaries. The data used in this study is from Germany.
SCIMA tietueen numero: 192348
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