haku: @author Schmalensee, R. / yhteensä: 16
viite: 6 / 16
| Tekijä: | Schmalensee, R. |
| Otsikko: | Competitive advantage and collusive optima. |
| Lehti: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1987 : DEC, VOL. 5:4, p. 351-367 |
| Asiasana: | OLIGOPOLY COSTS COMPETITION |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | A review of plausible alternatives in cost differences in real oligopolies. The study argues that if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective, the total industry profits, lacks plausibility when costs differ. Four different technologies for effecting collusion, essentially identical when costs are equal, define sets of possible profits. Axiomatic bargaining models are used to select inconstrained optima, and simple functional forms. The author expresses the view that if collusion is effective, low cost firms have relatively low estimated conjectural variations. Three Tables and eleven equations accompany the study. |
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