haku: @author Fehr, E. / yhteensä: 17
viite: 10 / 17
| Tekijä: | Fehr, E. Falk, A. |
| Otsikko: | Wage rigidity in a competitive incomplete contract market |
| Lehti: | Journal of Political Economy
1999 : FEB, VOL. 107:1, p. 106-134 |
| Asiasana: | COMPETITION CONTRACTS MARKETS |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | Do employers and workers underbid prevailing wages if there is unemployment? Do employers take advantage of workers' underbidding by lowering wages? The authors hypothesize that under conditions of incomplete labor contracts, wage levels may positively affect workers' propensity to cooperate. This, in turn, may prevent firms from underbidding or accepting the underbidding of workers. Wage cutting is costly for the employer if workers have discretion over their effort level. |
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