haku: @author Fehr, E. / yhteensä: 17
viite: 6 / 17
| Tekijä: | Fehr, E. List, J. |
| Otsikko: | The hidden costs and returns of incentives - Trust and trustworthiness among CEOs |
| Lehti: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2004 : SEP, VOL. 2:5, p. 743-771 |
| Asiasana: | Executives Management Incentives Students Individual behaviour |
| Kieli: | eng |
| Tiivistelmä: | This paper experimentally examines how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives (hereafter as: incs.) and how they provide incs. in situations requiring trust (here as: tr.) and trustworthiness (here as: t-ness.). To control the behaviour (here as: beh.) of CEOs is compared with the beh. of students (here as: stunds.). It is found that CEOs are considerably more trusting and exhibit more t-ness. than stunds. thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than stunds. Moreover, it is found that, for CEOs as well as for stunds, incs. based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy (here as: t-wthy.) beh. giving rise to hidden costs of incs. However, the availability of penalizing incs. also creates hidden returns. Thus tr. seems to reinforce t-wthy. beh. Overall, t-ness. is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and stunds. use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less. |
SCIMA